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Abstract
In a series of papers ov er the last ten years, I have outlined various problems affecting 
the assessment of the national curriculum in England which are the subject of a critique 
by Paul Newton (this issue). In responding to this critique, I acknowledge that his 
summary of my position is fair, and agree that, by the standards of analytic rationality, 
the evidence for some of the problems I identify is not compelling. However, in 
response I argue that by standards of reasonableness (eg on the balance of probabilities) 
the evidence is sufficently serious to warrant a re-examination of national curriculum 
assessment, and the alternatives. In particular, I argue that the current system provides 
assessments that are not sufficiently reliable for the inferences that are made on the 
basis of the results and has also caused a narrowing of the curriculum. I propose that the 
first of these weaknesses can be addressed through the increased use of teacher 
assessment, and the second by increasing the range of the curriculum tested through 
testing a greater proportion of the curriculum. In order to effect these changes without 
increasing the burdern on students and teachers, I propose that these two changes are 
combined in the form of a light sampling scheme which would increase both the 
reliability and minimise the curricular backwash, although the price paid for this would 
be the lack of a direct, transparent and objective link between the results achieved by 
individual students on tests and the reported levels of a school’s performance.
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Introduction
Between 1989 and 1991 I was closely involved in the development of national 
curriculum assessments for 14 year-olds in English, mathematics, science and 
technology, and since then I have written on the problems that I believe afflict our 
national curriculum assessment system (and indeed our examinations at GCSE and A-
level). However, I am aware that I have not drawn the various threads of these 
arguments together, and so I am particularly grateful that Paul Newton has taken the 
time to trawl through many of these papers (both published and unpublished) and 
constructed a critique of the ideas I have advanced (Newton, this issue).
In responding to his critique, the first thing to say is that his characterisation of my work 
in eminently fair and accurate. He has in some places highlighted areas where my thesis 
was ambiguous or unclear, and therefore in this response I will try to clarify what I was 
trying to say. He is also right to point out that some of my ideas have been laid out with 
more rhetorical force that supporting empirical evidence. In most cases, this is because 
the evidence does not yet exist, lending support to Newton’s argument that more 
evidence is needed. In other cases I have tried to support the thesis, either by additional 
argument or by citing empirical studies, which while not conducted specifically in the 
context of the national curriculum of England, nevertheless may be regarded as 
suggestive.
As far as possible, I have tried to adopt the same sequencing of topics as used by 
Newton in his paper, although there are places where I have deviated from this in order 
to avoid repetition.
The validity of national curriculum assessments
As Newton states, I have argued that national curriculum assessments assess only a part 
of the domain which they are purported to represent. This is partly by design, and partly 
by accident. By design, the national curriculum tests at key stages 2 and 3 do not assess 
the first attainment target in mathematics and science nor do they assess Speaking and 
Listening in English. By accident, or at least without, I think, being planned, the items 
that do test particular aspects of the national curriculum do so in a distinctive way. For 
example, in the national curriculum for mathematics, there are requirements for students 
to collect and interpret discrete and continuous data, which are impossible to assess 
adequately in a two-hour written test. It is also clear that teachers are able to predict 
which aspects of a subject do come up in the tests, and which do not (Wiliam, 1993).
Whether the fact that teachers can predict which aspects of a subject are not going to be 
tested subsequently results in these aspects not being taught is, as Newton notes, an 
empirical question, but in the absence of appropriate research evidence, I would suggest 
that the, admittedly less rigorous, evidence from the teaching unions and from school 
inspection reports presents, at the very least, a case to answer. Indeed, it could be argued 
that, given the way that narrow targets have distorted performance in the National 
Health Service and on the railway network, it would be extraordinary were school 
teaching not so affected.
The third link is the argument is, of course, that if these aspects of a subject are not 
taught, then the related competences are not developed, which is again an empirical 
question, and ideally would need to be undertaken for each national curriculum subject. 
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After all, if it were found that competence in algebra was independent of competence in 
geometry, this does not mean that we can conclude that competence in reading is 
independent of competence in writing.
The research that is needed is actually quite straightforward to undertake—my 
conjecture is that the levels of performance  in untested aspects of the national 
curriculum in each subject should decline while levels in the tested aspects should stay 
the same, or rise, as has been found elsewhere (Linn, 1994).
The reliability of national curriculum assessments
The main thrust of my arguments with regard to the reliability of national curriculum 
assessments (and GCSE and A-level examinations) is that data on the reliability of 
state-mandated assessments should be made available routinely, and that such data 
should be presented in a form that reflects how the results of the assessments are 
actually used. In this context, it is worth noting that in the 1970s the examination boards 
were happy to admit that A-level grades were accurate to at most one grade either way.
In respect of the latter point, I have argued that traditional definitions of reliability, as a 
form of ‘signal-to-noise’ ratio designed for continuous variables, create an unwarranted 
sense of security when used to describe assessments that are reported on discrete scales 
that are used to support dichotomous decisions. To illustrate this, table 1 (taken from 
Wiliam, 2000) shows how the reliability of an assessment system looks very different 
when presented as a classical reliability coefficient and in the form of the number of 
students getting their ‘correct’ grades (in the sense of the grade corresponding to their 
true score) when outcomes are reported on an 8-grade scale .
Reliability .60 .70 .80 .90 .95 .99
Grading accuracy 40% 45% 52% 65% 75% 90%
Table 1: impact of reliability of marking on accuracy of grading for an 8-grade scale
Newton regards ‘misclassification’ as a “highly problematic concept”, presumably 
because he regards ‘classification’ as equally problematic. However, as long as we 
accept the notion that, for a given assessment, a particular student will have a ‘true 
score’ (defined as the long-run average of the scores on repeated takings of the same or 
parallel tests without learning in between), then a student will have a true level or grade. 
For students whose true score is close to a level boundary, even if the test is highly 
reliable (ie yields fairly consistent scores for an individual) then they will sometimes get 
a level other than their true level. Of course, as Newton suggests, the fact that someone 
gets 26 marks as opposed to 27 marks doesn’t mean much in itself, but, if this means 
that they get a level 3 rather than a level 4 at the end of key stage 2, it is serious—the 
student may be punished by parents, expectations of the student may be revised 
downwards, and the student is regarded as in need of remediation in their secondary 
school, given ‘booster’ classes and required to repeat the end-of-year 6 test at the end of 
year 7. Perhaps, with a better understanding of errors of measurement, things would be 
better, but as long as marks on tests are used to make dichotomous decisions, then I 
maintain that our measure of reliability should be the accuracy of the decisions.
In a final comment on this issue, Newton suggests that the use of tasks or tests might 
well result in lower reliability (for the scores for individuals) than with the existing tests
—this is absolutely right, but it doesn’t matter because these scores are reported and 
used only at the group level, so that the reliability is close to 100%. Newton points out 
that the same would be true if the existing tests were reported only at whole-class or 
4
whole-school level, which is also right, and it might well be much better, as has been 
the case in the US for many years (although is changing rapidly now) for the results to 
be reported only at school level. However, even if the current tests were reported only at 
group level, and used to define an envelope of levels that the school could award, this 
would still create an incentive to narrow the curriculum by teaching only what appears 
in the test.
Formative and summative functions of assessment
I agree with Newton that one of the strengths of the current system of assessment in 
place in England and Wales is that the teacher is the student’s ally against the external 
agencies charged with assessment. This makes for a purity of role for the teacher which 
is attractive. The downside of this, however, is that the failure to use the detailed 
knowledge that teachers have about their students impoverishes the quality of the 
summative assessment (and in particular makes it less reliable and diminishes validity). 
In other words, while teachers may not demand to be involved in summative 
assessment, good summative assessment demands the involvement of teachers. This is 
why I believe that we need to find ways of ameliorating the tensions between formative 
and summative functions of assessment.
My problem with traditional tests is not that they necessitate narrow teaching and rote 
learning—indeed, our own work with teachers has shown that teachers developing their 
formative assessment practices produce improvements in learning even when this 
learning is measured with traditional timed tests and examinations (Black, Harrison, 
Lee, Marshall, & Wiliam, 2002). Rather, the problem is that such tests do not (or at 
least do not appear to) require deep learning. In high-stakes settings, therefore, teachers 
may believe that rote-learning provides a short-cut to improved scores. Whether this is 
true or not is almost irrelevant—there is evidence to suggest that many teachers believe 
that teaching well is incompatible with improving test scores. Furthermore because the 
existing tests systematically under-represent the constructs they are purported to assess 
they create the possibility of increasing scores by increasing a student’s competence on 
only part of the domain.
Incidentally, I have never argued (or believed) that the format of a test item determines 
the kind of capability that can be assessed, although measuring ‘higher-order’ skills 
would appear to be more difficult with multiple-choice items. For reasons that are not 
entirely clear (and probably not rational) there is a deep mistrust of multiple-choice 
items in the UK (see Wood, 1991), but in truth, we have never given them a fair trial. 
We are happy to expend tens of millions of pounds paying markers to mark open-ended 
items (the total annual marking bill in England across national curriculum tests, GCSE 
and A-level is around a quarter of a billion pounds), but somehow believe that actually 
creating the tests should be relatively cheap.
Nevertheless, there are some important differences between what makes a good test 
item for a formative function and for a summative one. For example, asking students to 
‘Simplify, if possible, 2a + 5b’ (Brown, Hart, & Küchemann, 1984) would be regarded 
as unfair in a summative test. The expectations of students that one has to ‘do work’ to 
get marks in a test might pressure some students (who would otherwise say that this 
expression cannot be simplified) into attempting to simplify the expression. These kinds 
of ‘trick’ questions are generally regarded as inappropriate for high-stakes tests. 
However, such items provide highly useful information for the teacher and so would be 
entirely appropriate for a formative purpose. The crucial feature of the system that I 
propose is that there is no routine aggregation from the teacher’s day-to-day records, 
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kept primarily for formative purposes, to the summative level that would be reported to 
students and their parents. The teacher would be free (indeed would be expected) to 
discount evidence related to ‘trick’ questions like the one given above, when arriving at 
a level.
The overall profile of levels for a class would be ‘moderated’ by the external tasks and 
tests (see below), which would ensure that the levels awarded could not be inflated by 
the teacher. There are many ways in which this could be done—the most severe would 
be to use the results of the external tasks and tests to define an ‘envelope’ of levels that 
the teacher was allowed to award, so that the distribution of the levels in the summative 
levels given by the teacher would have to be exactly the same as that for the external 
tasks and tests. In addition, in order to check that the teacher’s weighting of various 
aspects of the domain was something similar to those intended in the curriculum, 
requirements for correlation could be imposed, so that, to some extent at least, those 
getting high marks on the tasks and tests would be awarded high levels. However, this 
would be a crude measure, and there is no doubt that additional ways would be needed 
to detect and, where possible, eliminate the forms of bias noted by Newton (eg over-
emphasis on certain aspects of the domain, and inclusion of construct irrelevant 
variance, such as halo effects).
As I note in Wiliam (2000a), care must also be taken to avoid the teacher’s role in 
summative assessment driving underground formative evidence (eg when students do 
not divulge difficulties to the teacher because they believe it will be ‘held against 
them’). Ultimately, this can only be resolved through trust, but it can be ameliorated 
through the depersonalisation of the assessment procedure—while the assessment of the 
student against the criteria is undertaken by the teacher, it is important that the student 
understands that the criteria themselves are not determined by the teacher, but are 
external. Although not perfect, the teacher could then still claim to be the student’s ally.
Newton also raises the question of whether teachers’ assessments would, as I have 
claimed, be more reliable than those arising from tests. He is right to point out that 
continuous assessment over the period of the key stage is not a replication of the final 
assessment, and it would, indeed, be invidious if a student’s level were reduced by the 
teacher because the last recorded evidence of a particular aspect of the domain dated 
from the previous year. However, if we adopt the conceptual framework provided by 
generalisability theory (Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda, & Rajaratnam, 1972), then it is a 
logical necessity that the degree of unreliability contributed by student-task interactions 
will be lower than for a traditional test because there are more tasks, provided, of 
course, teachers can apply the correct standards, and base their levels on the ‘latest and 
best’ evidence. If we can control the other sources of unreliability (task-rater 
interactions, student-rater interactions, etc—see below) then teachers assessments will 
be more reliable than tests.
Evaluative assessments
The fundamental feature of the assessment system I propose is that the evaluative 
function of the assessment is based on light sampling. The logic of this is 
straightforward. In order to avoid the possibility of ‘teaching to the test’ we need to 
assess a greater proportion of the domain of interest. More precisely we want to create a 
situation in which we are happy for teachers to teach to the test, because the only way to 
improve the test score is to improve the performance of students on the whole domain.
Newton seems to suggest that this could be achieved by adding ‘authentic’  elements to 
the existing assessment, as happens in some science examinations which involved a 
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practical element. However, the problem with such an approach is the impact of task-
student interaction—put simply does that particular practical task suit the student? The 
work of Rich Shavelson, Bob Linn and others (Linn & Baker, 1996; Shavelson, Ruiz-
Primo, & Wiley, 1999) shows that not until the student attempts six or more such tasks 
does the average score across the tasks provide adequately reliable indications of the 
student’s capability. We could therefore require each student to take at least six tasks 
but this would be extremely time-consuming. More importantly, it is also unnecessary. 
The purpose of the external assessment is to ensure that there is no advantage to the 
teacher or the students of teaching only some of the curriculum, or teaching to only 
some of the students. However, we can get the same assurance by light sampling, since 
the teacher will not know which students will be tested on which parts of the 
curriculum. Now of course the score that a particular student gets will not be a reliable 
indicator of their achievement because of the task-student interaction described above, 
but the average score of the class across the particular tasks taken will be an accurate 
estimate of the average score of the class across all possible tasks (and one whose 
accuracy we can judge precisely).
This does raise problems of comparability as Newton notes, but the nature of 
comparability raised by a light sampling approach is not the same as that in which the 
test is to be used to impute scores to individuals. The classic definition of test 
equivalence is that two tests are equivalent (ie comparable) if it is a matter of 
indifference to the candidate which test is taken (Lord & Novick, 1968). For a light 
sampling scheme, assessments would be comparable to the extent that it was a matter of 
indifference which particular allocation  of tasks or tests to students was actually 
administered. Of course there will be particular allocations where, by chance, each 
student in a class is allocated the particular task or test that suits them best, but these 
will be extremely rare. With such a scheme there would be no requirement for each task 
or test to be strictly comparable to the others, in the same way that two tests can be 
equivalent without an item-by-item equivalence. The reliability of the system would, of 
course, have to investigated, but this could easily be undertaken by the allocation of 
different sampling schemes to the same classes.
The marking of these tasks would, as Newton notes, be more complex than current 
practice. It would not make sense to have one marker marking all of a school’s tasks 
and tests because they would need to become familiar with the marking scheme for 
every task and test. It would be much more sensible to send all the responses for a 
particular task or test, from many schools, to one marker. While this sounds 
administratively complex, with the use of bar-coding, this could be accomplished 
relatively straightforwardly.
The number of tasks and tests that would be required would need further research to 
determine, but, as Newton states, it would need to be very large to allow the re-use of 
tasks and tests from year to year. In cases where factors affecting the difficulty of items 
were well understood, item-shells might be used with computers to generate large sets 
of items of similar difficulty, and most, if not, all of the tasks and tests could probably 
be administered by computer within the next few years. Ultimately, even the marking of 
open-ended items may be possible by computer. However, Newton is right to sound 
cautions regarding the availability of people to design the tasks and tests, and it would 
be several years before a large enough bank of tasks and tests could be built up. 
Conclusion
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No assessment system can do everything, and therefore it is futile to ask “Is this system 
perfect?” The answer will always be no. What we can, and should, ask, is “Are the 
trade-offs between reliability, validity and manageability that we have settled upon the 
right ones?” In particular, we should ask whether the system that we currently have is 
the only way of satisfying the design requirements.
The current system is transparent in that there is an apparently objective relationship 
between the scores that students get on tests, the levels they are awarded as a result, and 
the scores of schools. The position of a school in a performance table is directly 
determined by aggregating the marks achieved by its pupils in tests. The question is then 
what are the trade-offs in the current system, and whether there are other ways of 
achieving the same ends with fewer adverse consequences. While there is no conclusive 
system-wide research to demonstrate that the adverse consequences of the current 
system are serious and far-ranging, I would maintain that there is enough evidence to 
suggest that something is seriously wrong with the current system. In doing this, I am 
arguing, along with Toulmin (2001) that in the absence of reliable knowledge about a 
particular issue, we sometimes have to rely on what appears to be reasonable. In the 
case of national curriculum assessment, while it may not be possible to demonstrate the 
adverse consequences ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, I believe the case is established ‘on 
the balance of probabilities’, particularly in terms of curricular distortion and the 
consistency of levels attributed to individual pupils.
In outlining an alternative model of national curriculum assessment my concern has 
been to attempt to work towards a system of assessment that delivers the same outputs 
as the current system—measures of the achievement of individual students, together 
with evaluative information on schools—but with fewer adverse consequences. 
The light sampling approach that I have outlined certainly could be expected to reduce 
the incentives to teachers for narrowing the curriculum, and may increase the reliability 
of the assessments made of individual pupils, although, as Newton notes, these are 
empirical questions which could be settled by undertaking further research. The trade 
off would be a lack of transparency in that the levels awarded to pupils would derive 
from integrative judgements by their teachers, rather than by the aggregation of marks.
Ultimately, the differences between Newton and myself seem to me to be mostly about 
the burden of proof. He regards the arguments I have advanced regarding both the 
deficiencies of the current system, and the strengths of my proposed alternative, as ‘not 
proven’. In the final sections of his paper, he lays out the essential elements of a 
research agenda, both into the adequacy of the current system, and of the alternatives. 
This is a very helpful contribution, and the challenge to research the researchable 
questions needs to be taken up. But at the same time, I think it is fair to ask whether we 
must we wait until all the evidence is in before things change. There is always the 
danger of making things worse, captured in the old adage that we cannot countenance 
change—things are bad enough as they are! The challenge for the educational research 
community is to provide policy-relevant findings when we cannot be certain about what 
to do. I welcome Newton’s contribution, not least in forcing me to clarify and develop 
my own thinking, and hope that others, too will join in this debate.
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